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Civic Education as Education for Peace in 
the Context of Serbia’s 2000 Democratic 
Revolution
Sanja Djerasimovic
The introduction of civic education in Serbia in 2001 marked a beginning of an all-
encompassing reform that set the tone for future changes designed to support the 
country’s democratization. This article draws on documentary and elite interview 
data to unpack the conceptualization of this policy, revealing it to be a multi-level 
positioning exercise in the national and international political space. It argues that, 
by using favorable political and international policy conditions, Serbian policymakers 
created a version of civic education that significantly drew on grassroots peace 
education programs developed during the 1990s, recognizing the priority of needs 
in building a democratic society. The latter offered Serbian policymakers agency in 
the context of what critical literature perceives as a transfer/imposition of policies in 
societies facing “Westernization.” 
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Introduction
In 2000, Serbia underwent what has since in public discourse been referred to 
as a “democratic revolution.” A communist country (as a part of the Yugoslavian 
federation) from 1945 onwards, it began transitioning to a state of multi-party 
politics and a market economy in 1990, concurrently with other formerly 
communist European countries. However, whilst most other countries continued 
on the path of democratization and liberalization, Serbia entered what would 
become a decade spent under the authoritarian regime of Slobodan Milošević. 
In addition to the regime’s illiberal governance, the country experienced extreme 
poverty, devastation of the economy, international isolation, and involvement in 
civil wars in Bosnia and Croatia in the early 1990s, and a military intervention in 
Kosovo that ended in NATO’s (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) bombing of 
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Serbia in 1999. Thus, when the new democratic government was finally installed 
in 2001, the urgency to “catch up” with the rest of the formerly communist Europe 
led to swiftly instigated reforms across all sectors of society. In education, the 
first, and one of the more symbolic steps of the early reform, was the decision to 
introduce civic education in primary and secondary schools. In this article, I use 
the account of this education policy development to interrogate the processes of 
educational decision-making at a nation-state level in the context of the country’s 
opening and reconstruction, and significant dependence on foreign investment, 
as well as, separately, examine the content of the policy and make observations on 
the nature and purpose of civic education.
The article will demonstrate how, using favorable economic and political 
conditions created in the wake of the authoritarian regime’s demise and the 
country’s accelerated transition to democracy, the then educational policymakers 
used the malleability of the concept of civic education to create their version 
of the subject. This example of the process of policymaking is intended to 
complicate what is in post-communist literature often described as a transfer, or 
rather adoption of, education policy as dictated by supranational organizations 
and/or Western-centric educational narratives.1 Serbian policy actors, it will 
be shown, made up in part from the progressive educators who had devised 
and delivered numerous peace education programs in Serbia during the 1990s, 
relied substantively on locally generated ideas on the importance of emotional 
expression, tolerance, and community, as the basis of developing the idea of 
citizenship-fostered-through-education. In this, the article argues, Serbia’s early 
version of civic education ended up sharing much of the precepts of peace 
education, and in some ways anticipated a version of post-national, peace-
fostering citizenship propagated through the contemporary global citizenship 
agenda (UNESCO 2015a; 2015b). 
The next section offers a brief introduction of the historical context of Serbia’s 
2000 democratic revolution, and the country’s socio-political positioning in the 
international space, thus setting the stage for the first proper post-communist 
educational reform that took place some ten years after reforms that swept 
through Europe following the fall of the Berlin Wall. It explains the relevance 
of this belated nature of the reform both contextually and conceptually, as well 
as presenting the circumstances and political significance of starting the reform 
with the introduction of civic education. The following section then further 
elaborates on Serbia’s 2001 reform in the wider framework of post-communist 
reform, and explains the international and supranational civic education policy 
setting in which it started. This is followed by the outline of the research design 
and the findings about the nature and meaning of the Serbian civic education 
policy, as an example of the use of discursive capital in negotiating and navigating 
the national and international policy space, and the then recognized importance 
of aligning the processes of building democratic citizenship and fostering positive 
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peace (Galtung 2011). The article concludes with thoughts on the contemporary 
nature of global civic education, the relationship between democracy and positive 
peace, and outlines possible directions for further study.
Serbia at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century
In 2000, following the final in the line of massive public protests against 
fraudulent elections, the decade long regime of Slobodan Milošević was brought 
to an end in Serbia’s “democratic revolution.” The 1990-2000 regime has been 
defined as “competitive authoritarianism” in the political theory literature 
(Levitsky and Way 2005), a version of a semi-authoritarian regime in which 
opposition existed and was very active, but was continually suppressed and 
oppressed. Elections were regularly held and the opposition won seats in the 
parliament, but through various degrees of fraud were never allowed victory. This 
political system distinction is important as it allows the reader to appreciate the 
existence of spaces for subversive action during the ten-year period, spaces in 
which the future education policy actors moved, collaborated, and created. 
Serbia’s turn-of-the-century democratic revolution also marked the 
beginning of the country’s first modern democracy. Although Serbia experienced 
multiparty politics as early as the nineteenth century (see Corovic 2004), both 
as an independent country, and, after World War I, as a part of the Kingdom 
of Yugoslavia, this never really blossomed into a full democracy, and its 
development was further halted by the institution of the communist system 
after World War II. This system experienced dissolution together with other 
communist systems in Europe, and by 1990 multi-party politics entered the 
scene once more. It is important to stress that communist Yugoslavia, one of the 
founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement in the 1960s, had enjoyed a 
much more liberal experience of communism than the members of the Eastern 
Bloc, as well as free global exchange of people and ideas as a result of its policy 
of neutrality in the Cold War, and was predicted by the commentators to be 
among the first countries to transition from state socialism to parliamentary 
democracy and a liberal economy (King 2000). However, the aftermath of the 
political-ideological collapse of the communist system also saw a dissolution 
of Yugoslavia as a federation of six republics (and two autonomous provinces), 
a violent disintegration accompanied by civil wars in the former republics of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, and the NATO bombing of Serbia due to its 
interventions in the autonomous, Albanian-majority Kosovo, which would also 
subsequently secede in 2006, and assume as yet unresolved status with(in) Serbia.
This “interruption” in the development of a modern democratic system 
of government had been referred to in Serbian public discourse as a “belated” 
or even “retarded” transition, as the countries formerly belonging to the 
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post-communist bloc (problematic though such nomenclature and implicit 
homogenization may be) journeyed on in their quest to democratization and 
Europeanization, with the first Eastern European countries achieving the goal of 
“returning back to Europe” (Birzea 1994) by entering the European Union (EU) 
in 2004. Once Serbia’s new democratic government was installed in 2001, the 
government proclaimed the processes of democratization, modernization, and 
Europeanization the goals of the overarching reform, including that of education, 
and pronounced education for democracy, of which civic education was to be 
one aspect, one of the chief drivers of these processes (Ministry of Education and 
Sport Republic of Serbia 2002). The introduction of a separate subject as a part of 
the multi-pronged drive towards building education for democratic citizenship 
(other aspects included a more democratic pedagogy in the system in which the 
transmission of knowledge had been the primary form of teaching and learning, 
and a more democratic system of school governance) had been planned from 
the very beginning, as evidenced in key policy documents. However, the prompt 
introduction of the subject of civic education, less than a year into the new 
government’s mandate, was perhaps provoked by an unexpected development in 
the form of a concession that the new government decided to offer to the Serbian 
Orthodox Church, a powerful ally, and allow the reintroduction of religious 
education in primary and secondary school curricula. Civic education was then 
offered as an alternative to religious education, and students in Serbia have since 
been choosing between one of these two “compulsory electives.” 
This opposition between religious and civic education is of no small 
significance, as it both symbolizes and fosters the polarization in Serbian society 
between the “traditional” and the “modern,” as well as promoting the idea of 
citizenship that is divorced from its roots in the national and the religious. 
The latter, as I will discuss below, has been perhaps one of the unintended 
consequences of building education for democratic citizenship on the foundations 
of peace programs, which, whilst important for connecting ideas of (positive) 
peace and democracy, in the context of the aftermath of ethnic conflict, inevitably 
eschewed the notions of national, ethnic, and religious belonging. What Serbian 
policymakers did achieve through this pragmatic as well as ideological handling 
of the issue was to use the then relevant European and global civic education 
initiatives as sources of both discursive and economic support to create a 
significantly self-referential (Schriewer 2003) version of a subject that could 
have otherwise become an example of policy transfer, colonized by an externally 
created educational discourse.
Serbia’s 2001 Reform and Civic Education Policy in Context 
As mentioned above, by the time Serbia began transitioning to democracy in 
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2000, a decade had passed since the dissolution of communism across Europe, 
and accompanying scholarship’s attempt to explain and predict the various new 
(especially in the light of the Soviet Union’s break-up) nation states’ trajectories, 
including in education. Most of these early attempts at post-communist models 
of education (see Birzea 1994, 1996; McLeish and Phillips 1998) were fairly linear 
in nature and assumed, if not a straightforward, then almost inevitable, transition 
from communism to democracy, with varying, contextually dependent degrees 
of complication and obstruction. Only later did it become clear that circularity, 
regression, and hybridity might indeed be possible. Some political theorists 
pointed out that these newly democratized states would develop systems of 
their own that could not follow the Western model created under very specific 
historic political and economic circumstances (Offe 1991; Blokker 2005), or that 
they would eventually achieve “democratization without decommunization” 
(Mungiu-Pippidi 2006). In the meantime, in education, authors began arguing for 
transformation in place of teleological transition (Silova 2010), and emphasized 
the need for scholars to explore these transformations in their own right, instead 
of judging the success with which the transition to a pre-determined state 
modelled after Western examples has been achieved.
Partly, this scepticism and criticism came from the undesirable effects of 
the modernizing, homogenizing paradigm assumed by international funding 
agencies such as the World Bank (Klees 2002), as well as the more soft power-led 
international organizations’ missions to deliver education of a certain kind and 
quality to systems that were ill-prepared for these transnational programs, but 
that accepted them through various models of policy transfer either because of 
the economic support that came with them or the expectation of the superiority 
of these solutions to any that would have been locally produced. Later, authors 
such as Silova and Steiner-Khamsi (Silova and Steiner-Khamsi 2008; Steiner-
Khamsi and Quist 2000) coined the concept of “transfer of discourse” (rather than 
policy), pointing out that post-communist countries were usually only adopting 
the discourse associated with the policy for reasons of signalling that they were on 
the “correct” course,2 but that the practices would have normally either remained 
unchanged or become layered with new practices, creating hybrid forms, but 
hardly leading to the Westernization of the post-communist classroom. 
The case of the Serbian civic education policy could have easily been 
described—and thus dismissed, obscuring the wealth of local agency and 
complexity of local-international interaction described below—as a case of 
discourse transfer. At the time of its introduction in Serbian schools, civic 
education was experiencing considerable popularity concurrent with, and to some 
degree, following from, late-modern concerns about the direction and purpose 
of education in the century characterized by globalization, marketization, and 
multi-culturalism (Turnbull 2002; Forrester 2003; Dahlin 2010), and the worries 
over prevailing apathy, a lack of trust in democratic institutions, and increased 
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individualization, xenophobia, and racism (Forrester 2003). Civic education has 
been imagined as holding the potential to imbue students with values, knowledge, 
and practices needed to make them capable of actively participating in an on-
going process that is democracy (Crick 2007). Designed to provide civic and 
political socialization, the subject of civic education has differed from one country 
to the next, depending on the particular needs of civil society, and the social, 
political, and educational context and tradition—from a greater focus on political 
education in Germany, to primarily values- and ethics-based civic education in 
Portugal, for example (Birzea 2004). But there were three broad domains of civic 
education that appeared across national policies: national identity, democracy, 
and social diversity and cohesion (Steiner-Khamsi, Torney-Purta, and Schwille 
2002). 
Since the end of the last century, similar ideas have been strengthened 
and internationally promoted through the work of organizations such as the 
Council of Europe, with its Education for Democratic Citizenship initiative 
(its second phase took place between 2001 and 2004), and the United Nations 
Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)-promoted decade 
of human rights education (1995-2004). The idea(l) of active social and 
political commitment was designed in such a way so as to encompass its 
cognitive (knowledge of legal and political systems and frameworks), affective 
(internalization of the “right” values), and social (knowledge of practicing 
democracy in all spheres of life and every circumstances) aspects (Duerr 2000). 
These initiatives attempted thus to incorporate diverse conceptualizations of civic 
education (here used as a broad umbrella term, similarly to how Levinson (2014) 
uses it interchangeably with citizen education), from a “thinner,” knowledge-
based tradition of civics to a “thicker,” value-based tradition of citizenship 
education (McLaughlin 1992).
These initiatives that saturated the transnational educational space, 
combined with the expectations specific to the nation state, and oft associated 
with financial aid, created fertile ground for the civic education policy 
(discourse) to be transferred from the international organizations’ guidelines 
into national policy documents, particularly in the context of post-war, post-
communist transition and (re)construction. In most other post-communist 
countries, some form of civic education had existed as a subject pre-1989, and 
was one of the first subjects to be removed from the curriculum in the post-1989 
deideologization, as it had been designed to help foster a kind of citizen desired 
by that political system, and usually imbued with Marxist and socialist ideas. 
Despite the existence, even during the communist era, of democratic practices in 
education such as equal provision of education to all (see Perry 2012), or youth 
movements that were rather close in idea and nature to the cohesive, community-
participating ideal proffered by programs such as Education for Democratic 
Citizenship, post-communist governments’ practice of developing “new” civic 
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education usually very often included addressing their “democratic deficit” (Nicoll 
et al. 2013) helped by Western (mostly American) educators and NGOs dedicated 
to education for democracy (Vaillant 2001; Buk-Berge 2006). In fact, some critics 
of the “democracy aid” agenda have pointed out that civic education tended to 
be a part of the wholesale democracy packages offered to the post-communist 
countries (see Carothers 2009). 
In Serbia too, the third sector that flourished during the 1990s and especially 
after the revolution, was funded in great part by international donors—
occasionally international organizations, occasionally the foreign aid agencies 
discussed by Carothers (ibid.)—and there were distinct channels through 
which imported programs could have ended up forming the core of Serbia’s 
civic education. Given the national political elite’s hurry to return to the course 
from which they felt the country had been side-tracked by a ten-year delay, 
perhaps it was to be expected that international solutions were to be quickly 
adopted and adapted. However, the ten-year delay did not happen in a vacuum. 
The processes and effects of the politically manipulated nationalism during the 
1990s created among Serbian educators a sense of clear normative direction for 
democratic citizenship post-2000, and one that was not necessarily simply a 
negation of authoritarianism. At the same time, Serbian educators had the time 
and the opportunity to observe other post-communist countries’ experiences of 
reform, and use these experiences to their advantage in preparing the ground 
for the reform of the Serbian system. With that, Serbian post-2000 educational 
policy elite were able to exercise a significant amount of agency when faced with 
international donors and transnational educational discourses. 
Project Details
The project on which the article draws was delivered through the author’s doctoral 
research conducted between 2011 and 2014, guided by questions about the origin 
of the civic education policy and its relationship to the wider reform discourse 
in post-2000 Serbia. The fieldwork consisted of nineteen elite interviews with 
various figures in Serbia (and one in the United Kingdom) who were identified 
through previous research as relevant policy actors. The focus on elite interviews 
was determined by a decision to examine the process of policy development only, 
and reserve the research of policy reception and “on the ground” implementation 
for a later study. The group of interviewees included the Minister for Education in 
the 2001-2003 government, his deputy, key civic education curriculum developers 
and leaders of the Serbian program for education for democratic citizenship 
(EDC), members of international funding agencies, members of Serbian and 
international civic education NGOs, as well as the most prominent critics of the 
reform. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with all of them, all but one 
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in Serbian, transcribed and analyzed in the original language. In addition to the 
interview data, the research project involved a large corpus of documentary data 
that was perceived as of significance in constructing the civic education policy 
discourse. Documents analyzed were the reform White Paper in both its Serbian 
and English versions, legislative documents through which civic and religious 
education were introduced, the national curriculum for civic education, Serbian 
media reports (predominantly newspaper articles) on the introduction of civic 
education, as well as transcripts of parliamentary debates about the introduction 
of electives and the wider reform. 
Interview and documentary data were treated like policy artifacts, following 
the policy-as-discourse theorization (see Ball 1993; Bacchi 2000), and used to (re)
construct the discourse at the time. Using the concepts of linguistic and symbolic 
capital developed by Bourdieu (1991), and ideological-discursive formation, a 
concept I coined to signify linguistic expressions of ideology in speech and text, a 
discursive resource that, when used in exchange for other kinds of capital, such as 
economic or political functions as discursive capital, I analyzed the construction 
and use of the civic education policy within different fields, that of education, 
culture, politics, and on different scales, national, international, and transnational. 
The analysis involved identifying themes and categories, similarly to traditional 
content analysis, and focusing within them on linguistic categories—words, 
phrases, clauses, syntax—and using these constructs to theorize the discursive 
behavior of the different policy actors, their alliances and conflicts, as well as the 
movement and transformation of the policy and its meaning across different 
fields. 
The (Re)Construction of the Civic Education Policy Discourse 
The analysis of data brought up different policyspeaks across both the national 
and transnational policyscapes. “Policyspeaks” (parallel to doublespeak or 
even triplespeak) is a term used by Steiner-Khamsi (2014) and Halász (2012) 
to describe a phenomenon engaged in by post-communist policymakers when 
speaking to different audiences, for example national and international ones. 
Serbian civic education policy was not a singular piece of prescribed norms and 
action—policies seldom are, although in most cases the message that is sent is 
presumed to be consistent across media, and in fields in which it is received. 
In the case of this policy, in the curriculum guidelines and the principles that 
prescribed pedagogic practice and widely organized teacher training, it may 
have appeared as straightforward and consistent. This was education that was 
supposed to help move forward a “modern, European, multi-ethnic society” 
and the processes of “democratization and European integration” of the Serbian 
society (Ministry of Education and Sport of Republic of Serbia 2002). However, 
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in the policy actors’ interactions, conflicts, and alliances, within different spaces 
and in different ways in which it was used as discursive capital, my analysis made 
a distinction between multiple versions—hence, “policyspeaks.” 
The construction of the various aspects of the policy discourse—i.e. various 
“speaks”—took place within and across different fields. On one hand, there was 
a distinction between national, regional, and transnational, or supranational 
fields that was particularly relevant for the sociological construction of the 
relationships of power, agency, and influence between the nation-state and 
international organizations and foreign governments in this theorization of 
a post-communist educational reform. On the other hand, there were fields 
constructed in a Bourdieusian sense, in which different types of discourses—
economic, cultural, political—were produced, and interacted with the educational 
field. The way that I used my analytical tools allowed me to create the narrative 
of a multidimensional policy discourse by looking at the intersection of scalar 
and discursive fields. In the first instance, relying in particular on my interview 
data, I mapped out the actors’ distribution across different fields and then looked 
at how they molded the policy, formed alliances and animosities, and derived 
and created meaning by drawing on different discursive resources from the 
political, cultural, and economic fields. Their discursive formations that betrayed 
(or sometimes constructed) the actors’ ideological narrative (with lowercase “i”) 
which were variously used as discursive capital drew on democracy, ethnicity, 
science, patriotism, religion, economy, and international relations. The national 
field consisted primarily of educational policymakers, educational practitioners, 
politicians, media, parents, and students. The regional field also included 
the policymakers, educational practitioners, and third sector organizations 
from neighboring, ex-Yugoslavian, or ex-communist countries. Finally, the 
international field of policy influence involved members of international 
organizations and international NGOs—primarily the Council of Europe, 
UNESCO, as well as NGOs dedicated to civic education (particularly a prominent 
UK organization), from whom advice on curriculum development was sought.
Next level analysis involved organizing these actors into “inner circle policy 
actors,” “outer circle policy actors,” and “commentators and critics,” based on 
the level of influence on policymaking. The first category included key national 
policymakers: senior ministry figures and members of the EDC expert group, 
curriculum developers and national actors in correspondence with the Council 
of Europe’s program. The second group involved advisors and collaborators, 
including members of the Civil Society3 NGO, the Belgrade office of Council 
of Europe, regional partners, and the Open Society Foundation, a donor 
organization that had been very active in the area of post-communist education 
reform, first in Europe and later predominantly Central Asia. The latter group 
also involved, although in a fairly limited capacity, the members of the public and 
educational practitioners who, albeit necessarily constructed as the recipients of 
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the policy, also had the possibility of participating in the wider reform discourse 
through various conferences and consultations that were organized during the 
early days of the reform. Finally, “commentators and critics” included those actors 
who constructed an “alternative” discourse, excluded from the primary decision-
making, but present in the policy discourse through the embodiment of the 
Other, the undesirable ideological-discursive narratives that the civic education 
policy had tried to negate: right wing members of the shadow cabinet, religious 
education policy lobbyists and curriculum developers, and the most prominent 
critics of the reform.
Going between the interview narratives and the different documentary 
artifacts of the policy discourse (official policy documents, parliamentary debates, 
media reports) allowed me to make a distinction between the following aspects of 
the policy discourse, or the following “policyspeaks”:
a)  Official: constructed primarily in policy documents and Serbian 
policymakers’ engagement with international partners (recounted in 
interview narratives);
b) Public: constructed in media and parliamentary debates;
c)  Political: constructed in individual, unofficial interactions between actors 
outside of the field of education, and recounted in interview narratives 
and some media documents; 
d)  Personal: constructed in sometimes official, occasionally unofficial, 
interactions, between actors belonging to the educational field, and 
recounted in interviews.
These policyspeaks were porous and communicated with one another, but 
the final one is particularly pertinent in the context of this article. It is here where 
the individual agency and local experience in shaping educational decisions 
prominently acted contra the agendas and processes in which educational 
decisions were used as legitimizing devices, signals of virtuous behavior, or 
political capital. 
For example, in the official policyspeak, Serbian civic education policy 
clearly appeared as an aspect of the global, and, specifically, Europe-wide drive 
towards instituting education for democratic citizenship into national curricula 
in order to fight political apathy and xenophobia. With it, Serbian policymakers 
could signal that they were on the same path as other post-communist countries, 
confirmed their “return” to Europe and their dedication to European values, 
and, by using the appropriate ideological-discursive resource (with significant 
similarity between Serbian and international education for democratic citizenship 
documents), aligned themselves with international actors and profited from 
their support and resources. Indeed, if one was analyzing the policy solely within 
this aspect, one would inevitably have to conclude on the somewhat pessimistic 
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note about the powerlessness of small and new states before the demands and 
dictates of international organizations and the agendas of the Western countries 
who shape them, or at the very least make a more cynical observation about the 
“powerless” countries’ opportunism. 
The public policyspeak primarily took place within the national field, and, 
therein, policy could have again been said to have been used as a signalling 
device, but with discursive resources drawing less on the field of education and 
more on the field of political ideology. With this new subject—and it variously 
appeared across the public sphere as education for democracy, democratic 
upbringing, or even education in humanities—policymakers could demonstrate 
the holy trinity of the reform (democratization, Europeanization, modernization) 
to the part of the Serbian electorate eager for a democratic change at all levels 
of society. Particularly in combination with religious education (and the two 
often featured together in the public sphere) of which it appeared a discursive 
polar opposite, it served to demonstrate that Serbia’s idea of democracy assumed 
an anti-religious, or at least a non-religious, concept of citizenship, leaving the 
dangerous discourses of religious nationalism and traditionalism behind. Finally, 
studied exclusively within the political policyspeak, it was apparently no more 
than a bargaining chip, used to assuage the concerns about the (re)introduction 
of the religious education into public schools in the post-war context, or even 
an attempt, as hypothesized by Bacevic (2005) for example, to appeal to both the 
progressive and the conservative strands of Serbian society.
In all these three policyspeaks, civic education discourse was constructed 
in fields external to education, and these external fields necessarily created the 
conditions and the wider context in which the subject was developed. But this 
does not mean that this wider context entirely determined the form of civic 
education. Within the conditions given, Serbian educators worked with what 
for them was a matter of strong personal and professional conviction rather 
than convenience: “Here was a chance to make a contribution, to mobilize the 
education system…I knew what the 1990s did to us, and I knew I had to accept 
this post if I was to cast out any remains of that period” (Interview with senior 
Ministry actor, Belgrade, May 2012).
The core of one of the six thematic education working groups in charge of 
the democratization of education and education for democratic citizenship was 
formed from the team of psychologists and pedagogues who had spent the 1980s 
preparing for a post-communist reform and the 1990s developing and delivering 
various peace education programs, and for whom the idea of citizenship to be 
fostered through this new subject necessarily had to incorporate mutuality, 
communication, emotional expression, and conflict management and resolution. 
It was clear in the processes of the subject development that these concepts bore 
more weight than the more overtly political—and more common in the context 
of post-communist civic education—development of self as an active citizen 
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or political animal. This contrast is expressed by the head of the Civil Society 
NGO who had at the time been part of the team working on the content of and 
the pedagogy for the Serbian civic education, and who took over providing the 
resources and training for the subject in 2003, after the change of government:
So the reform came down to the psychologization of the whole…of civic education, 
which is, I mean, when it comes to communication and social skills up until say year 
four, it is OK, after that, it demands a different kind of knowledge…So you have a 
certain kind of maturation with those young people, as a result of the knowledge that 
they acquire, the confidence that they acquire, and a different kind of relationship 
towards institutions that is built in this way…so we [later] developed these trainings, 
these teacher trainings, we assisted the Ministry, as we got some funding from the 
[U.S.] State Department, and if we had not had that funding, we would not have 
been able to do it. And nobody would have done it. Because it’s…a cause for worry. 
Because in our public system there is no desire to enable citizens to be be active 
citizens and function in a democratic setting (Interview with head of the Civil Society 
NGO, Belgrade, June 2012).
On the other hand, 2001-2003 curriculum developers saw their efforts as the 
necessary work on creating conditions under which students’ experiences would 
be developed in, and thus contribute to the context of non-violence recognized as 
the primary prerequisite for democracy.
Well the accent was…you see, we as a society don’t have a developed civic 
consciousness, or an understanding of democracy, so…we went for this option, 
for pragmatic reasons as well…with using the peace education and non-violent 
communication. We wanted for it to introduce a civil, a civic, approach to life 
(Interview with a senior EDC team member, Belgrade, February 2012).
But the focus was on the post-war context, on communication, non-violence, 
acceptance of diversity…and it was unnatural for our context for the national element 
to be present in civic education because civic education was imagined as education 
for co-operation (Interview with civic education curriculum developer, Belgrade, 
February 2012). 
The curriculum developers recounted that it was not their intention to 
completely omit the references to nation and religion, but they believed that in 
the post-war context it was more important to focus on building mutuality and 
community on different terms, until such time when conditions for discussing 
and constructing the nation were themselves less volatile. 
This softer, “psychologised” version of civic education was still a political 
one. Antinationalism is in itself political, and such a version of citizenship that 
renounces the national and the religious did create political adherents as well 
as adversaries in Serbia. During the 1990s, when the peace education programs 
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that would become the basis for civic education after 2000 were piloted, this was 
conducted in an atmosphere of fear of the authoritarian regime whose authority 
of violent nationalism was being challenged through these courses. “We were 
terrified the whole time, feeling that they could bust in at any time and shut 
everything down…and schools were afraid to let us in [but] sometimes the 
headmasters would secretly let us try out some of our workshops” (Interview with 
civic education curriculum developer, Belgrade, February 2012). Furthermore, 
the educators were aware of the activist, subversive nature of their work: 
“Our work, what we did, to us it was some sort of activism, it was a resistance 
movement” (Interview with civic education curriculum developer, Belgrade, 
February 2012).
In the end, the version of citizenship they were creating was not ideologically 
neutral—it hardly ever is. Those 1990s peace programs were, after all, primarily 
funded by United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), however much they may 
have built on was developed at Belgrade University, so it is perhaps unsurprising 
that there is significant similarity between the early Serbian version of civic 
education, before civil society took over with the change of government in 
Serbia in 2003, and the current UNESCO discourse of global citizenship based 
on the notions of human rights, multicultural co-existence, and responsible 
and responsive participation in a trans/post-national society (UNESCO 2015a; 
2015b). 
Citizenship Education as Education for Peace
Few instances of educational policymaking at a national level in a globalized 
world happen without the significant influence of regional and global 
international agendas and associated expectations and pressures that are often 
originating in economic and political fields with which the educational field 
is closely connected. As indicated earlier in the article, the mechanisms of 
influence, or even control, depend on national economic and political power, or 
the “national capital” (Ozga 2006), so in the case of European post-communist 
countries in the 1990s, or indeed across the “third world,” where a lot of 
educational reconstruction has depended on foreign loans, the degree to which 
the influence on national decisions in education is exercised leaves the nation-
state in a position of relative powerlessness. That is not to say, of course, that 
educational policy decisions equal educational practice, and the latter does not 
necessarily follow in the way envisaged by the (inter)national policy elite. What 
this article has hopefully demonstrated is that at a certain level of analysis, even 
before getting to the educational practice, policymaking itself can be marked by a 
substantial exercise of agency on the part of national policymakers, albeit perhaps 
not across all aspects of the policy discourse and all policyspeaks.
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Thus, whilst policyspeaks confined to the fields of economy, national, and 
international politics used civic education as discursive capital for different kinds 
of gain, where educational decisions on curriculum design and teacher training 
transcended the flags of convenience that were policy documents and political 
speeches, national decision-makers were the ones in control. This is testified 
both by the final outcomes that incorporated originally developed work on peace 
education during the 1990s and the educational theory and practice developed 
at Belgrade University decades earlier and partly sustained through NGO work 
during the unfavorable conditions of the 1990s when educators were often in 
conflict with the government (Djerasimovic and Maksimovic 2017). The national 
policymakers’ agency is also indicated by their and their foreign advisors’ reports 
of the extraordinary sense of preparedness with which they entered the reform, 
the latter even eventuating in a certain sense of pride or almost arrogance in 
noting the advanced state of their work in comparison with what was being 
offered by international consultants. 
Sometimes they [the Council of Europe] would send us someone, some Czech [who] 
probably got some licence for this during the 1990s…to come here and, to tell you 
the truth, it was like trying to teach your grandmother to suck eggs…we were so 
much further ahead than they were. So there was quite a lot of time-wasting in those 
situations (Interview with EDC team member, Belgrade, May 2012). 
This was partly due to the belated nature of the reform that allowed both the 
time to prepare and the opportunity to learn from others’ success and failures: “I 
wanted for Serbia not to go in the known wrong direction. Maybe we would have 
gone in an unknown one, but at least we did not have to go in the direction we 
knew was wrong” (Interview with senior Ministry actor, Belgrade, May 2012).
But there was little doubt that when it came to civic education, the Serbian 
EDC team had a fairly clear idea of what they wanted and what they thought 
Serbian society needed the most at that point in terms of creating conditions for 
democracy to develop, as noted by a member of a UK civic education NGO: 
I think I remember probably two visits to London of this group, and I have to say that 
we were very impressed by them! They were, um, I think we said in this evaluation, 
they were most advanced in their thinking than any of the central and eastern 
European countries that we had visited (Interview with UK civic education NGO, 
London, October 2012). 
One purpose of this article then has been to demonstrate that the concept 
of glocalisation (Bain 2010; Jahng 2011) in educational policymaking ought to 
take into account the agency of the national policymakers, and in a way that goes 
beyond recognizing the adroitness of the latter at using the policy discourse for 
achieving political and economic ends. In some of its aspects, educational policy 
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discourse can reflect a significant level of self-referentiality (Schriewer 2003) 
and the important role that the local knowledge and experience of educational 
matters can play in the context of unequal power relationship. 
Secondly, this reflection on the Serbian experience of creating civic 
education within the condition of building democracy in the post-war context 
points both to a high level of malleability and porousness between civic and peace 
education, and the need to re-examine their overt distinction, particularly where 
the contextual emphasis on the political knowledge within the national context 
obscures the wider global and extra-national construction of community and 
responsibility (see Djerasimovic (2018) for observation on Britishness—however 
multiculturally constructed—as the dominant, national axis of citizenship in 
English civic education). 
On a transnational scale, this conceptual integration is evident in the extreme 
similarity between, on one hand, UNESCO’s 1970s-1990s peace education 
discourse with its emphasis on non-violence, human rights, dialogue and 
cooperation, fostered within the democratic conditions of tolerance of diversity 
and multicultural understanding and an active participation of all members of 
society on achieving it (Rosandic 2000), and, on the other, the contemporary 
global citizenship education agenda:
Global citizenship education aims to be transformative, building the knowledge, skills, 
values and attitudes that learners need to be able to contribute to a more inclusive, 
just and peaceful world. Global citizenship education takes ‘a multifaceted approach, 
employing concepts and methodologies already applied in other areas, including 
human rights education, peace education, education for sustainable development 
and education for international understanding’ and aims to advance their common 
objectives (UNESCO 2015a).
 
Finally, in the literature, the combination of civic and peace education 
discourses appears in theorizations on democratic peace (Ericson 2000), forms 
of peace education that incorporate to a different degree most of the global 
citizenship education discourse (Harris 2004), and positive peace that is achieved 
through the absence of structural violence (Galtung 2011). Positive peace 
takes into account the conditions of economic and political oppression and 
inequality—the link to active, conscious, equal civic participation, rights, and 
responsibilities is clear—and the understanding that a peaceful world to aspire 
to is one that eliminates the culture of war through global citizenship education 
that teaches “living with justice and compassion; building intercultural respect, 
reconciliation, and solidarity; promotion of human rights and responsibilities; 




Through recounting the introduction and construction of civic education in the 
post-authoritarian, post-war Serbia, this article interrogated various levels of 
influence and discursive positioning inherent in policy production in the late 
modern world. Previous pages served to challenge the occasionally simplified 
notions of policy/discourse transfer and policy imposition in the conditions 
of political and economic inequality on a global stage, and underlined the 
importance of local knowledge and the various uses of discursive resources 
held by national policymakers. It is important to add that, whilst the ideas of 
citizenship as constructed within different fields—political, cultural, religious—
and the conceptual proximity of supranational citizenship and peace education 
programs were noted, the article has not given due consideration—as the focus 
was elsewhere—to the normative assumptions and cultural legacies shaping 
the idea of democracy and peace that are shared between Serbian and Western 
conceptions. In this, the Serbian case of the use of discursive capital by national 
policymakers in the international field is perhaps not as representative of other 
contexts where the conflict between the national and international discourses 
may be more pronounced and interlinked with much deeper structural and 
historical inequality in power relations, such as is the subject of critical (peace) 
education that indeed fosters the recognition of the occasional necessity and 
benefit of conflict (see Zembylas and Bekerman 2013). 
Finally, there is a danger whenever one is analyzing policy that the attention 
given to the politics, or even semiotics, of policy development obscures 
the realities of educational practice. Multiple studies on the effects of civic 
education—whether on political attitudes and participation, or ethnic distance 
and authoritarianism—conducted over the years, in Serbia as well as elsewhere 
(see Torney-Purta et al. 2001; Kahne, Chi, and Middaugh 2006; Džamonja-
Ignjatović, Baucal, and Radić-Dudić 2009; Vasiljevic 2009; Finkel, Horowitz, and 
Rojo-Mendoza 2012), were inconclusive on its effects. Whatever the conclusions 
about the potential for national-level educational policymaking to reflect context-
dependent needs and issues, more study is needed around the space and resources 
given to the practitioners to deliver these programs and the potential of the latter 
to achieve cohesion and peace, particularly in educational systems increasingly 
oriented and normatively conditioned towards performance, comparison, and 
competition. 
Notes
1. The author recognizes the risks of oversimplification inherent in using a West/East 
dichotomy, and notes the utilization of “Western” here as a heuristic device to denote 
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the so-called “first world” in the context in which international political and economic 
relations following the end of communism in Europe bear significantly on the making of 
educational decisions in “Eastern” countries post-1989.
2. Also see Lynch (1998) on the similar concept of “flags of convenience.”
3. The name is a pseudonym for a Belgrade-based NGO whose primary mandate is 
to support and assist with the development of civil society in Serbia. After the change of 
government in 2003, they have been heavily involved in delivering resources and teacher 
training for civic education.
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